Sunday, June 21, 2009

mas 马航专区

下为light crude oil的月均价:
2008
January $84.70
February $86.64
March $96.87
April $104.31
May $117.40
June $126.33
July $126.16
August $108.46
September $96.13
October $68.50
November $49.29
December $32.94
2009
January $33.07
February $31.04
March $40.13/$39.88
April $42.45/$42.20


马航的石油期货持仓:
5m08, 15,000,000 barrels,最迟2009dec到期。
8m08, 13,950,000 barrels,最迟2010dec到期。
11m08, 15,400,000 barrels,最迟2011dec到期。
2m09, 17,350,000 barrels,最迟2011dec到期。
6m09, 21,918,984 barrels,最迟2011dec到期。

MAS adopts a competitive fuel hedging policy, whereby it strives to have similar fuel cost with its peer competitors. MAS gradually built its hedging portfolio throughout the year. Due to the unprecedented collapse in fuel prices in late 2008 and early 2009, these contracts are in MTM loss position. These are unrealised losses as the fuel hedging contracts will mature over a 3-year period up to 31 December 2001. The unrealised MTM position will fluctuate based on the movement in the fuel forward curve. As at 31 March 2009, the unrealised fuel MTM loss is RM3,383 million. On a comparable basis, using fuel forward curve as at 29 May 2009, the unrealised fuel MTM loss has reduced by RM1,150 million. The total fuel volume hedged as at 8 June 2009 is 21.9 million barrels for the periods up to 31 December 2011. As of 31 March 2009, MAS has hedged 47% of its fuel requirement at USD103 per barrel for the rest of 2009. The average hedged fuel prices for 2010 and 2011 range from USD90 per barrel to USD100 per barrel.

Due to the unrealised net MTM losses, the Group Equity Holders’ Fund is unfavourably impacted. As at 31 March 2009, on FRS 139 basis, the Group Equity Holders’ Fund technically triggers the criteria under Paragraph 2.1 of PN 17 in relation to shareholders’ equity. A significant portion of the negative equity as at 31 March 2009 (on FRS 139 basis) is due to the unrealised net MTM position (RM3,328 million).

马航的fuel hedging contracts应该是飞机油,为了书写方便,一概以石油期货带过。

上面的summary看得出什么端倪吗?
idris和tony做了什么,我不能评。因为分析hedging对财务的影响是很细微的事,例如马航一年要用多少桶的油?idris在什么时候hedge了多少桶?什么价位?

根据osk的报告,马航在q408和q109的用油成本是1459.00m和713.00m,用油成本虽然少了746.00m,但是石油期货的realised loss 为640m,这证明了马航的对冲策略没有来乱的(以后就不知道)。
也就是说马航的亏损,只能归咎于搭客量和货运量。

这些石油期货都是long的,马航越买越多,airasia反而reverse退出。

马航的net asset已经变成-27sen,股价却没有暴跌,原因不是国企基金和国阵的阴谋,而是市场预知了FRS 139的冲击。FRS 139的意义在于把off balance的项目mark to market总结出来,对马航影响最大的就是hedge accounting。我对FRS 139不了解,不便赘述,但已经有许多guide关于FRS 139的可供下载。

invest_klse的部落格讲了不少,很多发现来自它,http://invest-klse.blogspot.com/

注:我不清楚他们的商品类型,只好通俗(eg:石油期货)带过。
如果没有错,airasia目前还可能是put option seller,如果油价不跌回40,就可以赚钱,看来他赌性难改,为什么这样说?因为我不认为option是很好的护盘工具,个人意见而已。

其实发表这些东西不是要你买航空,而是想替他们清洗一些罪。太多人把idris和tony形容得太窝囊了,虽然他们有错,但只有到“打他一顿”的程度,还没有到“通奸卖国”的程度。虽然知道有不少专业人士知道这些,但却很少机会看到他们的发表,我只有硬着头皮写些东西了。其实只要你看过他们的季报,非专业也是可以明白的。

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